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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action concerns a small parcel of real property which was
part of a larger tract derived from a U.S. Patent in 1871.

900

South Street, in Provo, proceeded east from University Avenue and
existed as a public highway since before 1869 and it continued as
such until 1989.

The highway was never dedicated as a public

street and existed only as a public easement.

The parcel of

property constituting 900 South existed on the County Recorder's
records

as

an

unowned

parcel

situated

between

Plaintiffs1

properties and Defendant's property.
Plaintiffs and appellants own property bounded on the south
side by this public easement.

Defendants own property bounded on

the north side by this public easement.
Defendants Provo City, et al, voted to vacate this street
without notice or an opportunity to be heard.
street,

Provo

City

previously

owned

commercial

building

seized

the

to the South
lot.

street,

Upon vacating the

joined

for the purpose

This action by

it

with

land

of gleaning

Provo City

a

deprived

Plaintiffs of street front property which had existed in the Provo
business district for over 100 years and landlocked a parcel of
land owned by Plaintiff Stephen Whitlock.

The trial court quieted

title in Defendants. The issues presented for this Court's review
involve the interests Plaintiffs have in the real property claimed
by Provo City.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Utah

statutory

law and

common

law provide

that

the

transfer of any real property bounded by a roadway passes title of
the person whose title is passed to the center of the road.

Upon

the city vacating the roadway, the title reverts to the abutting
landowners.
2.

Utah authority is clear and on point.

Defendant Provo City makes an improper assumptions, the

improper assumption is that Provo City held title to the roadway
pursuant to the Patent from the United States.

The patent did not

vest title in Provo City, it vested title in a trustee.

The entity

Provo City was never intended to hold title pursuant to federal
law.

Even

property,

if

the

Plaintiffs'

Provo

City

conveyance

predecessors

retained

fee

simple

title

by

the U.S. government's

in

interest
2

would

have

to

this

trustee

conveyed

to
the

property to the centerline of the roadway pursuant to common law
and statutory principles.
3.

Defendant's

constitutional

argument

that

"The

Utah

Township Act cannot be interpreted to burden the absolute power of
Congress to dispose of public lands by patent," is raised for the
first time on appeal and should not be considered.

Even if

considered, the Utah Supreme Court held as early as 1875 that the
Utah Township act was in compliance with the Federal Townsite act.
4.

In the alternative, Plaintiffs pled and proved that

Defendant failed to comply the statutory requirements prior to
vacating the roadway.

Provo City's Council met and passed an

ordinance vacating the roadway.

There was no notice, no fair

hearing or consideration of any substantial rights involved. Even
if Due Process requirements were met, and the public easement was
vacated,

Plaintiffs

private

easement

would

have

persisted.

Boskovich et al. v. Midvale City Corp. et a h , 243 P.2d 435 (Utah
1952).

By taking the land and selling it, Defendant has deprived

Plaintiffs

of

property

or

a

property

right

without

just

compensation and in violation of Due Process rights.
5.

The rule that a Municipality acquires a "limited fee," a

"determinable fee," or public easement in streets in platted
subdivisions is well established in Utah and is not a "narrow
exception" to the general rule.
LAW DETERMANATIVE TO ISSUES
Plaintiffs

cite

the

following

law

to

this

determanative of the issues involved in this action:
3

court

as

Public Highways.

When Deemed Dedicated

A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned
to the use of the public when it has been continuously used as a
public thoroughfare for a period of ten years.
(C.L. 17, 2801.)
Sec. 36-1-2, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933
FEDERAL TOWNSITE ACT, ch. 177, 14 Stat 541 (1867).
attached hereto as appendix 1.
UTAH TOWNSHIP ACT, U.C.A. 57-7-1, et seq.
hereto as appendix exhibit 2.

The act is

The act is attached

SEARS v. OGDEN CITY, 572 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1977).
attached hereto as appendix exhibit 3.

The case is

BOSKOVICH V. MIDVALE CITY CORP.. 243 P.2d 435 (Utah 1952).
The case is attached hereto as appendix exhitit 4.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST OWNED
TITLE AND REVERSIONARY INTEREST TO THE CENTER OF THE ROAD.
The propriety of Provo City obtaining fee simple title as a
result of the government patent is dealt with elsewhere, and it
would be improper.

For the sake of argument, Plaintiffs adopt the

position of Provo City that it retained fee simple title to the
property constituting the roadway 900 South.

Provo City obtained

fee simple title to the subject property pursuant to the U.S.
government's patent.

The Plaintiffs1 and Defendant's parcels were

conveyed from that patent pursuant to the Federal Townsite Act and
the

State

Township

Act.

Those

conveyance

were

pursuant

to

statutory and common law principles.
It

is an admitted

fact/ stated

in Defendants1

brief

and

uncontested in this action that the roadway 900 South existed prior
to 1869 when the first conveyances took place under the patent from
4

the United State Government.
Under common law, the conveyance of real property bounded by
the roadway passes title of the person whose estate is transferred
to the center of the roadway.

Many states, including Utah, have

adopted this principle as a statutory law.
and

The Utah Legislature

Supreme Court have adopted both common

law and

statutory

approaches incorporating this law.
A transfer of land bounded by a highway on a rightof-way for which the public has only an easement passes
the title of the person whose estate is transferred to
the middle of the highway.
§27-12-101, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended 1991).
"When the Board acquired the fee for the land abutting the
street, there was an presumption that the conveyance included the
fee to the highway center line subject to the public right of way
(determinable fee).

Sears v. Oqden City, 572 P.2d

1359

(Utah

1977), quoting Fenton v. Ceder Lumber and Hardware Co., 17 Utah 2d
99,

404 P.2d

966

(Utah 1965).

"Section

27-1-7, UCA

1953,

provided in part:
"* * * a transfer of land bounded by a highway
passes the title of the persons whose estate is
transferred to the middle of the highway." In Hummel v.
Young,fn5 this court pointed out that this statute was
declaratory of the common law, and that a private
conveyance of land bounded by or abutting on a highway,
the fee to which belongs to the abutting owners, is
presumed to convey the fee to the highway to the center
line thereof. This presumption is rebutted only by clear
evidence that the grantor did not intend to convey his
interest in the highway (notes omitted)
Fenton, supra at 968.
" . . .
Midvale's council enacted an ordinance
vacating the shaded area, which has been used by
vehicular travel.
The school board owned property
5

fn 4

abutting on both sides of the shaded area, and it took
possession thereof as owner to the middle of the vacated
street, fenced it off and made it part of the school
yard,..."
Boskovich v, Midvale City Corp, 243 P.2d 435 (Utah 1952)
A number of other jurisdictions have adopted the rule that a
conveyance is presumed to carry title to the center of the street.
Many of these
excluded

by

included

the

cases where the street appeared

description

in

the

deed.

In

to be

Champlain

v.

Pendleton. 13 Conn 23 (Conn. 1838) the description in the deed
described the south line of the land conveyed as the same as the
north line of the highway.
referred to in the deed.
center of the highway.

The highway was not mentioned

or

It was held that the fee passed to the
In Gear v. Barnum, 37 Conn 229 (Conn.

1870), the Court held that a deed conveying "a store building and
the land on which it stands," passes title and fee to the middle of
the highway abutting the store and real property.
In 1887 the Florida Supreme Court decided the case of Florida
Southern Rye. Co. v. Brown, 23 Fla 104, 1 South 512 (Fla. 1887).
The deed described the conveyance by words and figures but did not
specifically mention a street or highway.

It was held that the

grantee takes to the center line of the street upon which he abuts.
In 1886 the Massachusetts Supreme Court decided the case of Hamlin
v. Pairpoint Manfq. Co., 141 Mass 51, 6 E. 531 (Mass. 1886).

The

court held that where deeded land is bounded on a street, or its
boundary runs to the street and thence by the street, the grantee
takes to the middle of the street unless the deed indicates a clear
intent to exclude the street.
6

Provo City has cited New York law for the proposition that
Defendant retained the street.

However, the Court's attention is

drawn to the case of Sizer v. Devereaux, 16 Barb 160 (N.Y. 1853)
wherein it was held that where a parcel of land is described by
courses and distances and no road is named but on proof at trial it
is established that one line must be on a road, the land to the
center of the road is included in the conveyance.
B, DEFENDANTS' THEORY THAT THE ROADWAY WAS EXPRESSLY
EXCLUDED BY METES AND BOUNDS DESCRIPTION WAS RAISED
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL BUT SHOULD FAIL UNDER
UTAH AND COMMON LAW.
Respondent Provo City argues in its brief that the metes and
bounds descriptions in the deeds issued to Dunn and First Ward
Pasture

Company

(respectively

Plaintiffs'

and

Defendants1

predecessors in interest) expressly excluded 900 South Street.
This argument is being raised for the first time on appeal and did
not constitute any element of the underlying trial or the Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, or Judgment issued by the Trial Court
in this case.

Issues not raised before the trial court, nor

decided by the trial court, should not be raised or determined by
the appellant court.
"It is axiomatic that matters not presented to the trial
court may not be raised for the first time on appeal"
Franklin Fin v. New Empire Dev. Co. . 659 P.2d 1040, 1044
(Utah 1983).
Progressive Acquisition, Inc. v. Lytle, 806 P. 2d 239 (Utah App.
1991)
In addition, Plaintiffs believe the case to have been properly
framed by Defendants in the trial proceedings. Defendants1 counsel
stated
7

11

. . .we would state the issue more broadly, and that is
that Provo City owns this property in fee simple or do we
merely have a right-of-way.
I think the law will indicate and show that, if in
fact, we own the parcel in fee simple, then we have the
right to sell that parcel. If we have only a right-ofway then we concur and agree with Plaintiffs1 counsel
that then Plaintiffs' would take to the center of the
street, (transcript of trial p. 16 lines 11-20).
The issue was never raised, argued, or briefed that Provo City
had created an express reservation or express exclusion pursuant to
a metes and bounds description.

In fact, as previously provided to

this Court, the common law has not been so interpreted.
Should this Court consider this matter, it should still fail.
Many cases appear to be directly on point to the case presently
before the court.
situated

In 1855 Wisconsin held that a grantee of a lot

in a village platted

and

recorded

according

to

law,

described by metes and bounds, takes to the center of the street on
which the lot abuts subject to the public easement.
Kenosha, 4 Wis 321 (Wis. 1855).

Kimball v.

In 1895 the U.S. Supreme Court

held that a deed describing lots conveyed by reference to a plat,
which showed them bounded by a street, carried the fee in the land
to the middle of the street opposite the lots, even though the
statutory

dedication

of

the

street

had

been

vacated.

dimensions of the lots did not include the street.

The

Paine v.

Consumers' Forwarding and Storage Co., 71 Fed 626 (1895).

Other

cites have been previously briefed to this Court.
The case of Fenton v. Ceder Lumber and Hardware Co., supra is
illustrative. The Court provided: " . . . that a private conveyance
of land bounded by or abutting on a highway, the fee to which
8

belongs to the abutting owners, is presumed to convey the fee to
the highway to the center line thereof.

This presumption

is

rebutted only by clear evidence that the grant did not intend to
convey his interest in the highway" Id. at 968 (emphasis added).
The conveyance to Plaintiffs in this case satisfies the common
law requirements, as Plaintiffs derive their fee interest in the
real property from one who had the right to dispose of the fee
interest in the roadway.

In addition, the fact that the roadway

was never separately platted, nor conveyed or recorded for a period
in excess of 12 0 years, is further evidence that the grantor
intended to convey by common law principles.
C. KNIGHT V, THOMAS DID NOT PROVIDE THAT FEE SIMPLE TITLE
VESTS IN CITY UPON VACATION OR ABANDONMENT.
Provo City cites Knight v. Thomas for the proposition that the
city owns the roadway in fee. In that case, Jesse Knight sued to
enjoin Provo City from granting a street to the Rio Grande Western
Railroad.
be

A statute specifically required any such conveyance to

authorized

by

the

general

electorate.

The

Complaint

specifically alleged fee simple absolute title to the roadway in
Provo City.

Appeal was taken from a demurrer.

The Utah Supreme

Court provided:
The theory . . . is that the words "real property of such
city or incorporated town," contained in §313 do not
include, nor refer to streets of such city or town. We
think that is true so far as the question pertains to a
mere street in the city . . . but it is, in effect
alleged in the Complaint that the city is the owner in
fee of the land described in the Complaint and occupied
by the street, . . . for the purposes of the demurrer the
truth of these facts is admitted.
Knight v. Thomas, 101 P. 383, 384 (Utah 1909).
9

Contrary to the position of Defendants in the present case,
Knight v. Thomas does not hold that a city may have fee simple
title to a roadway.
POINT II
THE ENTITY PROVO CITY DID NOT OWN FEE SIMPLE ABSOLUTE TITLE
Provo maintains throughout its brief that it owned fee simple
title pursuant to the U.S. Patent.

A copy of that patent was

attached to Plaintiffs1 brief as exhibit 1.

The court should note

that the patent did not convey fee simple absolute title to Provo
City.

The patent conveyed the real property to Abraham 0. Smoot as

trustee "for the several use and benefit of the occupants thereof
according to their respective interests by virtue of an act of
congress

..."

The authority cited by Defendant in its brief is illustrative
of the improper assumption made by Provo.

Provo claims that the

corporate authorities of the Town of Provo became the purchasers of
the patent pursuant to the patent issued by the U. S. Government.
They further claim that they maintained their fee simple absolute
ownership by failing to convey the land constituting 900 South.
This is exactly the type of conduct that was prohibited by the
federal legislature in passing the Townsite Act, as evidenced by
the following exchange which occurred on the senate floor between
Senator Howard of Michigan and Senator Coness of California (as
provided in Defendant and Respondent's brief at 10):
MR. HOWARD. Does the Senator from California mean to be
understood that this bill provides that the corporate
authorities of the town may become the purchasers? Is
that the scheme here?
10

MR. CONESS.

No, Sir.

MR. HOWARD.

I so understood him

MR. CONESS. They simply enter the land as agents in trust for
the occupants, those in possession.
MR. HOWARD.

Do they get a title?

MR. CONESS. A title for the occupants from the United States.
MR. HOWARD.

Then they become the owners in trust.

MR. CONESS.

In trust.

That is it exactly.

Congressional Globe. 39 Cong., 2nd Sess. 1109
added)

(1867).

(emphasis

In effect, Provo City is attempting to do exactly that which
was opposed and intended to be avoided pursuant to the legislative
history provided.
In fact,

Provo1s claim that it retains fee simple ownership

in the roadway is directly opposed to the obligation imposed under
the trust.

Under the government patent, the public had only an

easement and was entitled to no more.
"These cases hold that the trustee under the
Townsite Act holds the legal title to the lands for the
use and benefit of the occupants according to their
respective interests. That the respective interests of
the occupants was to use and occupy the lands in the
manner they had previously done. That the lands which
had previously been used for streets and alleys and for
other public purposes must be held by the trustee for the
use of the occupants for the continuation of such use. .
it

. .

Hall v. North Qgden City. 175 P. 2d 703, 709
vacating
resulting

of the roadway

(Utah 1946).

to obtain a commercial

building

The
lot,

in land-locking one lot and depriving two others of

access to 900 South, would not be a continuation of the easement.
The question arises what happens when the continuation of such
11

use is no longer appropriate, such as in this case where the street
had been vacated.

In Hall, the Supreme

Court held that the

underlying interest must revert to the owner of the underlying fee
or the equitable owner.

In this case, common law and equity

existing at the time of the initial grant

indicated

that the

underlying fee belonged in the abutter.
POINT III
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE UTAH TOWNSHIP ACT IS
RAISED ON APPEAL FOR THE FIRST TIME, BUT IT FAILS ON ITS MERITS
Respondent raises for the first time on appeal the idea that
the Utah Township is unconstitutional pursuant to U.S. Constitution
Article 4, Section 3.

That issue is raised for the first time on

appeal and was neither briefed, argued, nor decided below.

It is

well established that issues which are raised for the first time on
appeal should not be considered by the appellate court.
"It is axiomatic that matters not presented to the trial
court may not be raised for the first time on appeal"
Franklin Fin v. New Empire Dev. Co. , 659 P.2d 1040, 1044
(Utah 1983).
Progressive Acquisition, Inc. v. Lytle, 806 P. 2d 239 (Utah App.
1991)
Notwithstanding the original nature of this argument, this
Court has previously held that the Township Act "was in harmony
with the act of congress, and within the authority conferred by the
act

of

congress

upon

the

territorial

legislature

and

the

instruction given by the legislature to the act of congress in this
particular is adopted by the court." Pratt v. Young, 1 Utah 3 47,
354,

(Utah 1876)

The Federal Townsite Act is included as an

addendum to this brief as Exhibit 1 and the State Township Act is
12

included as Exhibit 2.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT PROVO CITY IMPROPERLY VACATED 900 SOUTH
AND THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY VIOLATED PROPERTY AND
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.
Provo City has failed to even address the improper actions of
vacating and selling the easement.

The facts are undisputed that

the mechanism whereby Provo City vacated the roadway 900 South
consisted of "the regular Provo Municipal Council meeting of August
22, 1989, the council passed ordinance number 0-89-055.

This is an

ordinance vacating and setting aside a part of 900 South Street
near the intersection of 900 South and 100 East."

The notice of

vacation was published one time in the Provo Daily Herald on August
31, 1989.

(Trial exhibit no. 7, exhibit 7 to Plaintiffs1 brief,

appendix A to Respondents1 brief).
Plaintiffs had complained in paragraph 19 of the First Amended
Complaint that "900 South University Avenue was never properly
vacated pursuant to the ordinances of the city of Provo, and the
laws of the state of Utah." (R. 12, 1119). In addition, Plaintiffs
complained in paragraph 17 "the Defendants1 intent to seize and
convey the land

. . .is a seizure or taking of their property

without due process of law . . . "

(R.13, f17). These issues were

briefed by Plaintiffs in their trial memorandum of February, 1992
(R.44, Point VIII).
The memorandum decision by the trial court failed to address
these issues and on March 25, 1992, Plaintiffs filed a motion to
alter or amend findings and request for findings on alternate
13

causes of action.
issues (R.85)

Plaintiffs specifically sought a ruling on these

Although a subsequent hearing was held, the Court

failed and refused to address those issues.
A.
PROVO CITY FAILED TO PROPERLY VACATE THE STREET 900 SOUTH
In addition, or in the alternative, the vacating of a public
street requires certain formalities.

Utah Supreme Court confirmed

the necessity of adherence by county to the procedural requirements
for vacation of a county road to occur.
P.2d

595

persuasive

(Utah 1974).
effect

to

Ercanbrack v. Judd, 524

The doctrine should
the

vacation

municipality pursuant to §10-8-8.4.

of

a

extend with equal

city

roadway

by

a

The proof of publication

provided by the City recorder of the City of Provo shows that an
ordinance vacating the roadway was published one time on August 31,
1989.

The statute requires a notice of the pendency of a petition

or intent of the governing body to be published once a week for
four consecutive weeks.

Since the City has failed to comply with

statutory requirements, the vacating is ineffective.
Plaintiffs believe the case of Boskovich et al v. Midvale City
Corp et al 243 P. 2d 435 (Utah 1952) to be exactly identical and on
point.

In that case, the Midvale City Counsel, without notice to,

application by, or hearing of any kind afforded any property owner,
enacted an ordinance vacating a portion of Jordan Avenue and an
alley which had been used by vehicular travel.

The school board

owned property abutting on both sides of the street and alley, and
it took possession thereof as the owner to the middle of the
14

vacated street, fenced it off and made it part of the schoolyard,
creating a cul-de-sac as to Plaintiffs1 property on Jordan Avenue
and as to the property of Cox and Draper on the alley.

Plaintiffs

complained and the Supreme Court held:
There are a number of ways that streets may be
opened or closed.
If by ordinance, there must be
something more than its mere enactment. We believe and
hold that the procedure followed by Midvale in this case,
sans notice, petition or hearing, was an unquestioned
departure from the elementary principle that property
cannot be taken without due process of law and without
just compensation.
Furthermore, even if the city had satisfied the
requirements of due process by giving requirements of due
process by giving reasonable notice and conducting a fair
hearing, still it could have vacated no more that the
public easement or right which the city had in the shaded
area, which would in turn have the effect of relieving it
from further responsibility for maintenance and control.
The private easement which Mr. B, plaintiff herein had,
would have persisted.
*

*

*

Defendants are not remediless. Midvale might have
ended the public easement by ordinance so long as
pertinent statutory and due process requirements were
satisfied. The school board might have eliminated the
private easement by orderly employment of the statutory
provisions and fundamental principles relating to eminent
domain, but neither could take from Mr. B his private
easement without fair compensation.
Boskovich v. Midvale City Corp. 243 P.2d 435 (Utah 1952)
Provo City failed to comply with the statutory scheme required
to vacate a public roadway, and as such Plaintiffs are entitled to
set

aside

the vacating

ordinance,

compensation for their loss.

15

or

are

entitled

to

just

POINT B
UPON VACATING THE STREET, PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED
TO A PRIVATE EASEMENT OR COMPENSATION.
Plaintiffs, and their predecessors in interest, have had
passage

over

900 South

in Provo.

existence for over 12 0 years.

That easement has been

in

Section 10-8-8.5 provides that "any

lot owner shall retain his right of way and easement in any street
which has been vacated by the municipality."

Therefore, these

Plaintiffs maintain a right of passage over the roadway.
It has also been held that when a public easement has been
laid out and a right-to-use has arisen, a private easement arises
therein which constitutes a vested proprietory interest in the lot
owners, which easement survives extinguishment of any co-existing
public easement calling for just compensation.

Boskovich, Id. at

437; Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah 501, 126 P 959 (Utah 1912).
In this case the elimination of 900 SOuth Street was of
significant

importance

to

Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs

Nelson

had

commercial property on a corner in the business district of Provo.
Their establishment was available to traffic moving north and south
on University Avenue or east and west on 900 South.
As previously discussed, Stephen Whitlock owns a parcel of
property which is now landlocked as a result of closing 900 South.
Plaintiffs

Stephen

and

Sheila

Whitlock

have

been

deprived

of

valuable corner property and 100 East and 900 South, with traffic
only able to enter their establishment from 100 East.

No due

process was accorded these parties prior to vacating the road and
no offer of compensation has ever been made.
16

POINT V
THE RULE THAT A MUNICIPALITY ACQUIRES A LIMITED FEE
IS NOT A NARROW EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE
Defendant
municipality

claims

in

its

brief

acquires a determinable

that

"the

fee in the

rule

that

a

streets of a

platted subdivision is a narrow exception to the common law."

To

the contrary, the rule is well established in Utah by statute as
well as by common law.

Plaintiff again cites Knight v. Thomas,

supra., for the proposition.
Point I C.

That has been previously briefed in

Defendants argument fails to address the 1884 laws of

Utah cited by Appellant in its opening brief, which limits the
right of a municipality to take real property in fee simple title.
The municipality was not entitled to do that under the laws in
existance at that time.

Section 2071. S 7. CLU 1888, provided "by

taking or accepting land for a highway, the public acquire only the
right-of-way, and incidents necessary to enjoin and maintaining it.
A transfer of land bounded by a highway, passes the title of the
person whose estate is transferred, to the center of the highway."
In addition, this Court should note that in Justice Crockett's
opinion in Sears v. Qgden City, 537 P.2d 1029, 1030, Knight v.
Thomas, supra., is cited for the proposition "that the board of
education is the abutting landowner, and thus the land occupied by
the street would revert to the board of education." Justice Maughn
cites favorably in Sears v. Qgden City, 572 P. 2d 1359,1363 to Payne
v.

City

of

Laremy,

Wyo,

398

P.2d

557,

562

(1965)

for

the

proposition "upon passage of the ordinance vacating the street, the
city no longer had any title or interest in the premises; and
17

therefore the city had nothing to sell or convey and the quitclaim
deed was a nullity as to any interests in the roadway dedicated in
the Argonne Park Plat."
Chief Justice Wolfe, concurring in Boskovich, supra., stated
"this Court referred to the interest of the county in a platted
subdivision as both a determinable or a limited fee and a public
easement using the terms interchangably."
Provo City then goes on to state that a rule requiring the
City to obtain a deed to property it claimed to own in fee simple
absolute would be unreasonable as the City would have to get a deed
for a every

street it reserved

Plaintiffs1 position at all.

for public use.

This

is not

Plaintiffs1 position clearly is that

any street laid out and platted, or upon which the public had an
easment, would continue in such capacity until the easement or
determinable fee were vacated.

At which point it would revert to

the abutting landowners subject to the equitable principles and
private easement rules specified herein.

Under Plaintiffs1 view,

the City would be required to get a deed for every street which it
claimed to own in fee simple absolute and which it later intended
to vacate, convert to a commercial building cite, and sell without
any regard to the public or private easements contained therein.
This position is supported by the express lanquage of the State
Township Act.
CONCLUSION
When this action was initiated it was Plaintiffs1 desires to
have clear title to the property at issue in this action.
18

Since

the property has now been converted to a commercial building site
and

conveyed,

Plaintiffs

request

that

title

be

quieted

in

Plaintiffs to the center of the road, and that the case be remanded
for a determination of damages.
In the alternative, Plaintiffs request the Court to hold that
the act of vacating the street was improper and the vacation is
invalid.

Plaintiffs request the case be remanded to the trial

court for a determination of Plaintiffs1 private easement rights
and/or

the

issue

of

just

compensation

for

the

loss

of

that

easement.
DATED AND SIGNED this J>S

day of April, 1993.
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Ap€orney for the Plaintiffs/Appellants
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last day shall fall on a Sunday, Christmas day, or on any day appointed
by the President of the United States as a day of public fast or thanksgiving, or on the Fourth of July, in which case the time shall be reckoned
exclusive of that day also.
SEC. 49. And be it further enacted, That all the jurisdiction, power, Jurisdiction of
and authority conferred upon and vested in the District Court of the United States
United States by this act in cases in bankruptcy are hereby conferred ^strrictnofhCoupon and vested in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and Jnmbia and Terin and upon the supreme courts of the several Territories of the United ntones.
States, when the bankrupt.resides in the said District of Columbia or in
either of the said Territories. And in those judicial districts which are j n districts not
not within any organized circuit of the United States, the power and in organized cirjurisdiction of a circuit court in bankruptcy may be exercised by the exe'rdse^ower
district judge.
of circuit court.
SEC. 50. And be it further enacted, That this act shall commence and When act to
take effect as to the appointment of the officers created hereby, and the t a k e e f f e c t
promulgation of rules and general orders, from and after the date of its
approval: Provided, That no petition or other proceeding under this act Proviso,
shall be filed, received, or commenced before the first day of June, anno
Domini, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven.
APPROVED, March 2, 1867.
CHAP. CLXXVIL — An Act forth, Relief of the Inhabitants of Cities and Totons March 2,1867.'
upon the Public'Lands.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That whenever any portion of . T o 5 n autnori the public lands of the United States have been or shall be settled upon enter public
and occupied as a town site, and therefore not subject to entry under the lands occupied
agricultural pre-emption laws, it shall be lawful, in case such town shall mintmum^ice*
be incorporated, for the corporate authorities thereof, and if not incorpor- in trust, &c.
ated, for the judge of the county court for the county in which such town
may be situated, to enter at the proper land office, and at the minimum
price, the land so settled and occupied, in trust for the several use and
benefit of the occupants thereof, according to their respective interests;
the execution of which trust, as to the disposal of the lots in such town, Trust, how
and the proceeds of the sales thereof, to be conducted under such rules executed,
and regulations as may be prescribed by the legislative authority of the
State or Territory in which the same may be situated: Provided, That
the entry of the land intended by this act to be made shall be made, or a Entry, &c.
declaratory statement of the purpose of the inhabitants to enter it as a whentobe
town site under this act shall be filed with the register of the proper land
'
office, prior to the commencement of the public sale of the body of land
in which it is included, and that the entry or declaratory statement shall *° include
include only such lands as is actually occupied by the town and the title
'
to which is in the United States. If upon surveyed lands the entry shall upon surin its exterior limit be made in conformity to the legal subdivisions of the YCVgo()laD|f*5i
public lands authorized by the act of twenty-fourth April, one thousand Vol. iii. p. 666
eight hundred and twenty ; and where the inhabitants are in number one
hundred and less than two hundred, shall embrace not exceeding three
hundred and twenty acres ; and in cases where the inhabitants of such Amount of
town are more than two hundred and less than one thousand, shall em- *and tnat may
brace not exceeding six hundred and forty acres; and where the number
of inhabitants is one thousand and over one thousand, shall embrace not
exceeding twelve hundred and eighty acres : Provided, That for each ad- Proviso,
ditional one thousand inhabitants, not exceeding five thousand in all, a
further grant of three hundred and twenty acres shall be allowed : And . Where there
provided further, That in any Territory in which a land office may not ^ t ^ t e ^ te
have been established, declaratory statements as hereinbefore providedfiledwhere.
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THIRTY-NINTH

CONGRESS.

SESS. II.

CH. 177, 178, 179.

1867.

may be filed with the surveyor-general of the surveying district in which
the lands are situate, who shall transmit said declaratory statement to the
Certain acts general land office: And provided, further, That any act of said trusof trustees to be t e e s n o t m ade in conformity to the rules and regulations herein alluded to
Regulations, shall be void ; effect to be given to the foregoing provisions according to
such regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior:
This act not And provided farther, That the provisions of this act shall not apply to
to apply to cer- military or other reservations heretofore made by the United States, nor
tain reservato reservations for lighthouses, custom-houses, mints, or such other public
tions ;
purposes as the interests of the United States may require, whether held
under reservations through the land office by title derived from the Crown
nor to mines of Spain, or otherwise: And provided further, That no title shall be acof gold, &c.
quired, under the provisions of this act, to any mine of gold, silver, cinnabar, or copper.
APPROVED, March 2, 1867.
March 2,1867. CHAP. CLXXVIIL — An Act allowing the Duties on foreign Merchandise imported
into the Port of Albany to be secured and paid at that Place.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
Albany, New States of America in Congress assembled^ That Albany, in the State of
York, made a
port of delivery. New York, and within the collection district of New York, be, and is

hereby, declared to be a port of delivery within the aforesaid district; and
there shall be appointed a surveyor of customs, to reside at 6aid port, who
shall, in addition to the customary duties performed by that officer in
1831, ch. 87. other places, perform the duties prescribed in an act entitled " An act alVol. iv. p. 480. lowing the foreign merchandise imported into Pittsburg, Wheeling, Cincinnati, Louisville, Saint Louis, Nashville, and Natchez, to be secured
and paid at those places," approved March two, eighteen hundred and
Bond, fees, and thirty-one. ' The said surveyor, before taking the oath of office, shall give
salary.
security to the United States for the faithful performance of his duties in
the sum of ten thousand dollars, and shall receive, in addition to the customary fees and emoluments of his office, an annual salary of six hundred
dollars.
Privileges and
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted. That the same privileges granted to
restrictions ap- the ports of delivery mentioned in the first section of this act, and the
plicable.
restrictions created by the said act, are hereby extended and made applicable to all goods, wares, and merchandise imported into the United
States at any port of entry and destined to said port of Albany.
Privileges of
SEC. 3. And be it further enacted. That the Secretary of the Treasury
former acts, &c. shall be, and he is hereby, authorized to extend the privileges of the
extended to this
warehouse acts of August six, eighteen hundred and forty-six, and March
port.
1846, ch. 84. twenty-eight, eighteen hundred and fifty-four, and the regulations of the
Vol. ix. p. 53.
1854, ch. 30. Treasury Department relating thereto, to the said port of Albany.
Surveyor.

Vol. x. p. 270.

APPROVED, March 2, 1867.

March 2, 1867. CHAP. CLXXIX. — An Act to create the Office of Surveyor-General in the Territory oj
Montana, and establish a Land Office in the Territories of Montana and Arizona.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
Snrveyor-gen- States of America in Congress assembled, That the President, by the aderal for Montana.

vice and consent of the Senate, shall be, and he is hereby, authorized to

Salary and da- appoint a surveyor-general for Montana, whose annual salary shall be
ties.
three thousand dollars, and whose power, authority, and duties shall be
Clerk hire,
office rent, and
fuel.
Montana and
Arizona land
districts established.

the same as those provided by law for the surveyor-general of Oregon.
He shall have proper allowances for clerk hire, office rent and fuel, what
is now allowed by law to the surveyor-general of Oregon.
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That the public lands within the
Territories of Montana and Arizona, to which the Indian title is or shall
be extinguished, shall each respectively constitute a new land district to
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elusive of the improvements thereon made by the
claimant or his grantors, and the value of such improvements The issues joined thereon must be tried
as in law actions and the value of the real estate and
of such improvements must be separately ascertained
on the trial
WW
57-6-3

Rights of parties — Acquiring other's interest or hold as tenants in common
The plaintiff in the main action mav thereupon pay
the appraised value of the improvements and take
the property but should he fail to do so after a rea
sonable time to be fixed by the court the defendant
may take the property upon paying its value exclu
sive of the improvements If this is not done within a
reasonable time to be fixed by the court the parties
will be held to be tenants in common of all the real
estate including the improvements each holding an
interest proportionate to the values ascertained on
the trial

1953

accordance with the provisions of this chapter, but
not otherwise
™™
57-6-8. Improvements made by occupants ol
land granted to state
Any person having improvements on any real es
tate granted to the state in aid of any work of internal
improvement, whose title thereto is questioned by an
other, may remove such improvements without m
jury otherwise to such real estate, at any time befoi 1
he is evicted therefrom, or he may claim and have th
benefit of this chapter by proceeding as herein d
rected
i»>
CHAPTER 7
TOWNSITES
Section
57-7-1

Disposition of lots to persons entitled at
ter entry
Notice of entry
Claims to lots to be filed — Time and
place
Adverse claims — Determination
Proof of claims when no adverse clam
advanced
Conveyance and deed to proper claim
ant
When judge is claimant of lands
When city or town officer is claimant ol
lands
Change of venue
Statement of expenses
Payment to be made before conveyance
Full payment to be made within s \
months — Lien for nonpayment
Sale to satisfy
Errors in measurement or computation
Death of officer — Authority to complt u
trust vests in successor
Disposition of unclaimed lands
Sale of unclaimed lands
Reservation of lands for public uses
Disposition of proceeds of sales
Possession for ten years entitles claim
ant to conveyance

57-6-4. Certain persons deemed to hold under
color of title.
A purchaser in good faith at any judicial or tax sale
made by the proper person or officer has color of title
within the meaning of this chapter whether such
person or officer has sufficient authority to sell or not
unless such want of authority was known to such purchaser at the time of the sale and any person has
color of title who has occupied a tract of real estate by
himself or by those under whom he claims for the
term of five years or who has thus occupied it for less
time if he or those under whom he claims, have at
any time during such occupancy with the knowledge
or consent express or implied, of the real owner made
any valuable improvements thereon, or if he or those
under whom he claims have at any time during such
occupancy paid the ordinary county taxes thereon for
any one year and two years have elapsed without a
repayment of the same by the owner thereof and
such occupancy is continued up to the time at which
the action is brought by which the recovery of the
real estate is obtained and his rights shall pass to his
assignees or representatives but nothing in this
chapter shall be construed to give tenants color of
title against their landlords
1953

57-7-2
57-7-3

57-6-5

57-7-1. Disposition of lots to persons entitled af
ter entry.
When the corporate authorities of any city or town
or the district judge of any county in which any city
or town may be situated, shall have entered at the
proper land office the land or any part of the land
settled and occupied as the site of such city or tow n
pursuant to and by virtue of the provisions of the Ac t
of Congress entitled "An act for the relief of the in
habitants of cities and towns upon the public land^
approved March 2, 1867, and acts amendatory thereof
and supplementary thereto, it shall be the duty ol
such corporate authorities or judge, as the case ma,
be, to dispose of and convey the title to such land 0/
to the several blocks, lots, parcels or shares thereof U
the persons entitled thereto, who shall be ascertained
as hereinafter prescribed
190 j

Settlers under state or federal law or
contract deemed occupying claimants
When any person has settled upon any real estate
and occupied the same for three years under or by
virtue of any law or contract with the proper officers
of the state for the purchase thereof or under any law
of or by virtue of any purchase from the United
States and shall have made valuable improvements
thereon and shall be found not to be the owner
thereof or not to have acquired a right to purchase
the same from the state or the United States such
person shall be an occupying claimant within the
meaning of this chapter
1953
57-6-6 Setoff a g a i n s t claim for i m p r o v e m e n t s .
In the cases above provided for if the occupying
claimant has committed any injury to the real estate
by cutting timber or otherwise the plaintiff may set
the same off against any claim for improvements
made by the claimant
1&53
57-6-7. When execution on judgment of possession may issue.
The plaintiff in the main action is entitled to an
execution to put him in possession of his property in

57-7 4
57-7-5
57-7 6
57-7 7
57-7 8
57-7-9
57-7 10
57-7-11
57-7-12
57 7 13
57 7 14
57-7-15
57-7-16
57 7-17
57 7 18
57-7 19

57-7-2. Notice of entry
Within thirty days after the entry of any such land
the corporate authorities or judge entering the same
shall give public notice of the entry in at least five
public places within such city or town, and shall pub
lish the notice in some newspaper printed and pub
lished in this state and having a general circulation

xnjrLU

in such city or town. The notice shall be published
once a week for at least three successive months, and
shall contain an accurate description of the lands so
entered as stated in the certificate of entry or the
duplicate receipt received from the officer of the land
office.
i»M
57-7-3. Claims to lots to be filed — Time and
place.
Every person claiming any lot or parcel of such
land shall, within six months after the first publication of the notice, in person or by his agent or attorney, sign a statement in writing containing an accurate description of the particular lot or parcel of land
in which he claims to have an interest and the specific right, interest or estate therein which he claims
to be entitled to receive, and he shall deliver the same
to the clerk of the district court of the county in which
such city or town is situated. Such clerk shall enter
the statements in a book to be kept for that purpose,
and shall file and preserve them in his office, noting
the day of filing The filing of each statement shall be
considered notice to all persons claiming any interest
in the lands described therein of the claim of the
party filing the same, and any person failing to make
and deliver a statement within the time limited in
this section shall be forever barred of the right of
claiming or recovering such land, or any interest or
estate therein or in any part thereof, in any court;
provided, that when good cause is shown why such
statement could not be filed within the time herein
specified the judge may extend the time, not exceeding one year from the first publication of such notice.
1953

57-7-4. A d v e r s e claims — Determination.
If at the expiration of six months after the first
publication of such notice it shall be found by the
statements filed that there are adverse claimants to
any lot or parcel of land, it shall be the duty of the
district judge, taking up each case in the order of
filing, to cause notice to be served upon the claimants
thereto, or their agents or attorneys, to appear before
the district court and prosecute their claims upon a
day to be appointed by the court, not less than five
nor more than thirty days from the service of such
notice. The statements filed as aforesaid shall stand
in the place of pleadings, and an issue may be made
thereon. On the day set for the hearing the court
shall proceed to hear the evidence adduced in support
of the allegations of the parties and shall decide according to the justice of the case.
lesa
57-7-5. Proof of claims when no adverse claim
advanced.
After the expiration of the six months for filing
statements, if there are no adverse claimants, the
court, taking up the cases in the order of filing, shall
cause a summons to be issued and served upon each
party filing a statement, or his agent, requiring him
to appear before the court upon a day designated, not
less than three nor more than ten days from the service of such summons and make proof of his statement.
1953
57-7-6.

C o n v e y a n c e and deed to proper claimant.
Where the entry of the townsite shall have been
made by the district judge the conveyance shall be
made by him in accordance with the judgment entered. Where the corporate authorities shall have
made the entry the court shall certify its judgment to
the city commissioners or mayor of the city, or to t h e

&Olt\LKj
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president of the board of trustees of t h e town, who
shall accordingly make to the party claimant the
proper deed.
1&&3
57-7-7. When j u d g e is c l a i m a n t of l a n d s .
If the district judge shall be a claimant of lands in
any city or town in his county, he may file the statement required in Section 57-7-3 in the district court
of an adjoining district, and a copy of the statement in
that of his own county. The judge of the district court
of the adjoining county shall then proceed as provided
for in Section 57-7-4 or 57-7-5, as t h e case may be;
and he shall, moreover, give notice to t h e city commissioners or mayor of such city or t h e president of
the board of trustees of such town, or, in case of an
unincorporated town, to the justice court judge of the
precinct in which such town may be situated. T h e
court shall thereafter proceed as in other cases provided for in this title, and a deed to the land shall be
made to the party entitled thereto.
1990
57-7-8. When city or town officer is claimant of
lands.
If a city commissioner or t h e mayor of any city or
the president of the board of trustees of any town
shall he a claimant of lands in such city or town, the
recorder or the clerk thereof, as t h e case m a y be,
shall, upon t h e certificate of the district court made
as in the case of other claimants, execute a deed of
conveyance to such claimant for t h e lands finally adjudged to him by the court.
1953
57-7-9. C h a n g e of v e n u e .
A change of venue as in actions a t law shall be
allowed in all cases arising under this title.
1953
57-7-10. Statement of e x p e n s e s .
Within thirty days after the expiration of t h e six
months prescribed in Section 57-7-3 for filing statements the corporate authorities, or the judge, and the
board of county commissioners shall render in writing a true account of all moneys expended in t h e acquisition of the title to t h e land and in t h e administration or execution of the trust up to t h a t time, including purchase money, necessary traveling expenses, and the costs for posting and publishing notices. Such account shall be filed in the office of t h e
clerk of the district court of the county in which such
city or town may be situated, and shall during ordinary business hours be open for inspection to all persons interested.
1953
57-7-11.

P a y m e n t to b e m a d e before c o n v e y ance.
Before the corporate authorities or judge shall be
required to execute, acknowledge or deliver any deed
of conveyance to any person adjudged to be entitled
thereto such person shall pay or tender to the city
commissioners, the mayor, the president of the board
of trustees or the judge, as the case may be, the sum
of money chargeable on t h e land to be conveyed by
such deed. To ascertain t h e sum chargeable, streets
and public grounds must be deducted from all t h e
land entered, and then such sum shall be t h e proportionate costs of the land conveyed and the proportionate expenses thereof, with interest together with a
reasonable charge for the preparation, execution and
acknowledgment of the deed.
1953
57-7-12.

Full payment to be m a d e within six
months — Lien for n o n p a y m e n t — Sale
to satisfy.
Full payment for land shall be made to the district
judge, the city commissioners, the mayor or the presi-

dent of the board of trustees, as the case may be,
within six months after the certificate is issued to the
claimant. In case of nonpayment within the time
herein specified, the amount due shall be deemed a
judgment lien upon the land claimed, and the judge,
the city commissioners, the mayor or the president of
the board of trustees, as the case may be, shall proceed to sell it by sheriffs safe in the same manner as
land is sold under execution, subject, however, to redemption as provided by law.
1953
57-7-13,

Errors in measurement or computation.
Errors in measurement or computation shall not
invalidate any proceedings under this title.
1953

57-7-14. Death of officer — Authority to complete trust vests in successor.
In case of death or disability of the district judge,
the city commissioners, the mayor or the president of
the board of trustees before the complete execution of
the trust, the same shall vest in their successors in
office.
WW
57-7-15. Disposition of u n c l a i m e d lands.
If there shall remain any unclaimed lands within
such city or town after the expiration of six months
from the publication of the notice provided for in Section 57-7-2, the city commissioners, the mayor or the
president of the board of trustees, in cases where
lands have been entered for a municipal corporation,
or the district judge, in cases where lands have been
entered in trust by him, shall cause the same to be
surveyed and platted into suitable blocks, lots, streets
and a))eys. A certified p)at of such surveyed
lands
shall be filed for record in the office of the county
recorder of the county.
1953

57-7-16. Sale of unclaimed lands.
The city commissioners, the mayor, the president of
the board of trustees or district judge may sell or
cause to be sold such blocks or lots at public auction
to the highest bidder for cash, after public notice of
the time and place of such sale published at least
forty days in some newspaper published in the
county, if there is any, otherwise in a newspaper having general circulation in the county. If any of such
lands remain unsold for want of a bidder, the city
commissioners, the mayor, the president of the board
of trustees or district judge may sell or cause the
same to be sold at public or private sale, on such
terms as may be deemed for the best interest of the
city or town; provided, that none of such lands shall
be sold for less than $5 per acre.
1953
57-7-17, Reservation of lands for public uses.
Lots or parcels of land necessary for streets, public
squares, parks, schoolhouses, hospitals, asylums, fire
engine and hose houses, pesthouses, state or other
public buildings, or public use, may be reserved by
the city commissioners, the mayor, the president of
the board of trustees or the district judge, as the case
may be; and he may execute and deliver to the proper
party a deed for any property set aside for such purposes.
1953
57-7-18. Disposition of proceeds of sales.
All moneys arising from the sale of lands, after
deducting the costs and charges of such sales, shall be
paid into the city or town treasury in cases where
such lands have been entered in trust by corporate
authority, or into the county treasury in cases where
such lands have been entered in trust by the district
judge; and the same shall be set apart and applied by

the city commissioners or city council, or by the board
of trustees of an incorporated town, or by the board of
county commissioners in case of an unincorporated
town, for the improvement of public squares and
streets, the construction of sewers or procuring a supply of water for the use and benefit of the inhabitants
of the city or town.
19W
57-7-19.

P o s s e s s i o n for ten years entitles claimant to conveyance.
Whenever any lot, piece or parcel of land shall have
passed from the United States to the district judge of
any county in this state or to the probate judge of any
county in the late territory of Utah, under and by
virtue of the provisions of an Act of Congress entitled
"An act for the relief of the inhabitants of cities and
towns upon the public lands," approved March 2,
1867, or any amendments thereto, and there is no
record of any conveyance from such judge or his successor in office to the claimants thereof, any person,
who by himself or by or through his predecessors in
interest shall have had continuous and exclusive possession of such lot, piece or parcel of land for the period often years before the filing of the petition hereinafter mentioned and who shall have paid the taxes
thereon during said time, shall be deemed the rightful owner of such land, and it shall be conclusively
presumed that he has complied with all of the provisions of law for obtaining title thereto; and such person may at any time apply to the judge of the district
court of the county wherein said land may be situated
for a conveyance of the legal title to such land to him,
and such judge of the district court is hereby vested
with power and authority to execute such conveyance
and carry out the trust, and he shall execute a conveyance to such person of such lot, piece or parcel of
land without any expense to such person, except the
ordinary costs of court. Such conveyance, when so executed by any judge of the district court, shall pass to
such person all the right, title and interest so held in
trust to such lot, piece or parcel of land to all intents
and purposes and with the same effect as if a proper
conveyance had been executed after proper proceedings in the manner provided by law.
1953
CHAPTER 8
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movement following him, including Lydia
M. Child's, Against Capital Punishment, of
1842,15 has continued to the present day.
Twelve of our sister states have abolished
capital punishment. Their names and dates
of abolition are: Alaska (1957); Hawaii
(1957); Iowa (1965); Maine (1887); Michigan (1847); Minnesota (1911); North Dakota (1915); Oregon (1964); Rhode Island
(1852); Vermont (1965); West Virginia
(1965); and Wisconsin (1853).16
Numerous statistical studies have been
made comparing contiguous states with
similar populations, and comparable political, social and economic structures. Some
of these states have lacked, some have retained capital punishment; but the homicide rates remain the same and have sustained trends over long periods of time;
irrespective of the use or non-use of the
capital sanction.17 If it is deterrence we
look for, we do not find it in the death
penalty. Are we in Utah more in need of a
death penalty than the citizens of the sister
states mentioned above?
Although great discretion is conferred on
the legislative body to determine what
measures and means are reasonably necessary for the protection of the interests of
the public, the reasonableness of the means
selected must be judged within the context
of the uniqueness of the penalty prescribed.
The death penalty attains a degree of arbitrariness, because it has no real and substantial relation to the objects sought to be
attained, viz., deterrence and protection of
society. In contrast, there is no doubt life
is an inherent and fundamental right. The
only rationalization to support the power of
the state to exact the death penalty is vengeance. Revenge is not a function of the
law.
The legitimate and substantial purpose of
the state to protect society and deter homi15. Annals of America, Vol. 7, p. 66.
16. Of these states Rhode Island and Vermont
retain the death penalty for first degree murder
only in specifically restricted situations, viz.,
while in confinement (Rhode Island); for a
second unrelated offense, prison personnel, law

cide can be achieved by restraint, a narrower means than obliteration of a human life.
Therefore, the death penalty violates due
process of law, as an arbitrary, unreasonable, and ineffectual method to achieve the
desired purpose.
Were there some way to restore the bereaved and wounded survivors, and the victims, to what was once theirs; there could
then be justification for the capital sanction. Sadly, such is not available to us.

( O I KEYNUMBERSYSTEM>
2
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M. L. SEARS, Joseph Behling, Frank A.
Salimeno, Robert G. Hartmann, and
James L. Lavender, on behalf of themselves and all other taxpayers similarly
situated, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
OGDEN CITY, a body politic, Mayor A.
Stephen Dirks, Council of Ogden City,
and Donna Adams, Ogden City Recorder, Defendants and Respondents.
M. L. SEARS et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
OGDEN CITY, Defendant.
No. 14986.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 8, 1977.

Actions brought by taxpayers and
property owners against city and board of
enforcement officer in performance of duty
(Vermont). In Vermont the penalty may be
death or life imprisonment. See: CBS Almanac 1976.
17. Encyc. Brit., Note 10, supra.
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education for declaration that ordinance vacating street was invalid and to enjoin closing of street were consolidated for trial.
The Second District Court, Weber County,
G. Hal Taylor, J., rendered judgment of no
cause for action against plaintiffs, and
plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court,
Maughan, J., held that plaintiffs, who did
not allege or show fraud or collusion and
who had not suffered special injury different in kind from that suffered by the public, had no standing to challenge ordinance
and (2) upon termination of city's interest,
underlying fee reverted to board as sole
abutting property owner along vacated
street.

efit of ordinance, that vacated street, title
and interest to which was conveyed by quitclaim deed to city board of education, the
sole abutting property owner. U.C.A.1953,
10-&-S.1.
4. Municipal Corporations <s=» 663(2)
Where board of education was sole
abutting property owner along vacated
street, fee interest in street reverted to
board without deed from city upon vacation
and any private easements other property
owners had were not reversionary interests
entitling them to the underlying fee. U.C.
A.1953, 10-8-S.5.

5. Municipal Corporations <s=>871
City, which did not own underlying fee
in vacated street, had no proprietary interest in property and was not entitled to
1. Municipal Corporations <s=»657(2)
compensation, and thus city's giving of
Authority to vacate streets, when exer- quitclaim deed to vacated street, which had
cised in the general public interest, is a been appraised at $13,300, to board of edulegislative power vested in municipal corpo- cation, which as consideration undertook to
rations. U.C.A.1953, 10-8-8.1.
construct storm sewer along vacated street
at estimated cost of $36,200, was not sub2. Municipal
Corporations
<s=» 657(5), ject to challenge as a sham or gift of public
1000(5)
property to board.
In a proceeding to set aside a street
vacation order, a complainant should allege
that by reason of closing street he has sufPete N. Vlahos, Ogden, for plaintiffs and
fered special damage different in kind from
appellants.
damage to general public; however, a taxpayer is not required to show special damTimothy W. Blackburn, Richard W.
age or injury where right to relief is Campbell, Ogden, for defendants and regrounded on illegal acts claimed to operate spondents.
as constructive fraud affecting city and its
citizens.
MAUGHAN, Justice:
Affirmed.

3. Municipal Corporations <s=> 1000(4)
Where there was no allegation or evidence of fraud or collusion, and none of
plaintiff taxpayers and property owners
had suffered special injury different in kind
from that of public in general since their
property did not abut on street to be vacated nor was their access substantially impaired, plaintiffs had no standing to challenge ordinance of city, which performed
legislative function in weighing public ben-

Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment in favor of defendants concerning the vacation
of a street in Ogden, Utah. Plaintiffs are
taxpayers, and two are owners of real property in the Argonne Park subdivision. We
affirm. Costs to respondents. All statutory references are to U.C.A.1953.
The inception of this conflict was a petition in which the defendant, Board of Education of Ogden, as the sole abutting property owner, along 29th Street between Har-
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rison Boulevard and Tyler Avenue, requested vacation of the street by defendant, Ogden City. The street bisects the campus of
Ogden High School, and the students to
move from one area to the other must cross
the street.
The City Council accepted the petition
and referred it to the Planning Commission
for study. After considering the reports
and recommendations from the administrative personnel, the council adopted a proposed ordinance vacating the street. The
matter was set for a public hearing, and the
council ordered publication of notice of the
hearing and the proposed ordinance. Subsequently, a public hearing was held, where
the opponents and proponents expressed
their views. After consideration of all the
issues, the council passed the ordinance vacating the street. The ordinance was thereafter published and became effective April
20, 1976.
The city and board entered into an agreement for the purchase of the vacated street.
As consideration, the board undertook to
construct a storm sewer along the vacated
street; the estimated cost of this work was
$36,200. The value of the vacated area was
appraised at $13,300. Thereafter, the city
conveyed by quit claim deed whatever
right, title, or interest it had in the vacated
street to the board.
Plaintiffs then filed a complaint against
the city seeking a declaration that the ordinance was invalid and enjoining the closing
of the street. Thereafter, plaintiffs filed
an action against the board seeking similar
relief. The two actions were consolidated
for trial, and a judgment of no cause for
action was rendered against plaintiffs.
The city's interest in the vacated street
was derived from three sources. Only the
northern third of its width was part of the
platted subdivision of Argonne Park, the
streets of which were dedicated to the public. Of the remaining width, the western
1.

half of the length was platted and dedicated as Corbett's Addition. The eastern half
was quit claimed to the city by Ralph E.
Hoag Company for perpetual use as a
street. Corbett's Addition consisted of the
block between 29th and 30th streets, which
is completely owned by the board; this
addition was vacated in 1904. The Hoag
property was not part of a platted subdivision.
The Argonne Park subdivision was dedicated in 1921 and consisted of five blocks.
Blocks 1 and 4 were located in the area
between 28th and 29th streets, these are
owned by the board and are occupied by the
northern half of the campus. Blocks 2 and
5 are divided by Kershaw Street and are
located in the block east of the school.
Block 3 is situated on the west of Polk
Avenue. There are sixty-five homes on
blocks 2, and 3, and 5. Thus the two plaintiffs who own property in Argonne Park
are neither abutting property owners on the
vacated street nor are they deprived of
access to their property by the vacation.
Plaintiffs challenge the validity of the
ordinance on the ground the city did not
comply with the notice provisions in Sec.
10-8-8.4, U.C.A.1953, and that the vacation
was not in the best interest of the general
public.
[1] There are certain basic principles to
be applied in assessing plaintiffs' claim.
The authority to vacate streets, when exercised in the general public interest, is a
legislative power vested in municipal corporations.1
Section 10-8-8.1, U.C.A.1953, provides:
On petition by a person owning a lot in
the city, praying that a street
be vacated
. . the governing body
of such a city, upon hearing, and upon
being satisfied that there is good cause
for such
. vacation
that it will not be detrimental to the
general interest, and that it should be

11 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3rd Ed. Revised) § 30.185, p. 97.

1362

Utah

572 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

made, may declare by ordinance such
street . . . vacated
. . .
When such legislative authority is challenged, the applicable principle is:
Apart from arbitrary action or clear
abuse of discretion, or fraud or collusion,
or unless there occurs an invasion of
property rights, the propriety or necessity
of vacating a street, are matters within
the discretion of the municipal authorities, which will not be inquired into by
the courts. Faithfulness to the public
trust reposed in the members of the legislative body will be presumed.
. .2
One who will be specially injured, but
not others may sue to enjoin the vacation
of a street or alley, where unlawful, but
not if the proceedings are regular and the
remedy at law by an action for damages
is adequate.
.3
If the street directly in front of one's
property is not vacated but the portion
vacated is in another block, so that he
may use an intersecting cross street, it is
almost universally held that he does not
suffer a special injury as entitles him to
damages. And this is so notwithstanding
the new route is less convenient or the
diversion of travel depreciates the value
of his property. The inconvenience to the
lot owner in having to adopt a less direct
route to reach certain points, it has frequently been said, is an injury of the
same kind as that suffered by the general
public. If means of ingress and egress
are not cut off or lessened in the block of
the abutting owner, but only rendered
less convenient because of being less direct to other points in the city, and made
so by the vacation of the street in another
block, such consequence is damnum absque injuria. . . . 4

[2] In a proceeding to set aside a vacation order, a complainant should allege that
by reason of closing the street he has suffered special damages different in kind
from the damage to the general public.
However, a taxpayer is not required to
show special damage or injury where the
right to relief is grounded on illegal acts of
the council claimed to operate as a constructive fraud affecting the city and its citizens.5
[3] In applying the foregoing principles
to this action, the trial court ruled correctly,
for the plaintiffs had no standing to challenge the ordinance. There was no allegation or evidence of fraud or collusion. The
city performed a legislative function when
they weighed the public benefit of the ordinance. The courts may not delve into the
wisdom of a legislative act; it is only where
there is no possible benefit to the public
that the courts will review such a legislative determination. In Tuttle v. Sowadzki,*
this court stated:
It is elementary, however,
that a person cannot object to the vacation of a highway if he has no other
interest therein save as one of the public.
None of the plaintiffs has suffered a special
injury different in kind to the public in
general, and, therefore, none has standing
to challenge the vacation, viz., those whose
property does not abut on the street to be
vacated or whose access is not substantially
impaired have no standing to challenge a
procedurally correct vacation.7
Plaintiffs' claim of procedural infirmity is
predicated on the provision in Sec. 10-8-8.4,
requiring publication for four consecutive
weeks prior to an action on a petition or

2. Id. §30.187, p. 116.

6. 41 Utah 501, 514, 126 P. 959, 964 (1912).

3. Id. § 30.200, p. 142.

7. Banchero v. City Council of the City of Seattle, 2 Wash.App. 519, 468 P.2d 724 (1970);
Hoskins v. Kirkland, 7 Wash.App. 957, 503
P.2d 1117 (1972); Clifford v. City of Cheyenne,
Wyo., 487 P.2d 1325 (1971).

4. Id. § 30.194, pp. 129-130.
5. Id. § 30.207, p. 157.
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intention to vacate. The notice provisions
of section 8.4 are specifically declared inapplicable in the situation set forth in Sec.
10-8-8.3. The latter section states that the
notice of the intention of the governing
body to vacate is not required, where there
is written consent by the owners of the
property abutting the part of the street
proposed to be vacated.
The plaintiffs, who are owners of property in Argonne Park subdivision, claim the
city's quit claim deed to the board was null
and void and was an attempt to deprive
them of their "reversionary interests" in
the vacated street.
[4] This court has held that the interest
a municipal body acquires in the streets in a
platted subdivision is a determinable fee.
Upon vacation by the governing authorities,
the fee reverts to the abutting property
owner.8 Since the board was the sole abutting property owner along the vacated
street, the fee interest would revert thereto
without a deed from the city.
Section 10-8-8.5, U.C.A.1953, provides
that the action of the governing body vacating a street, which has been dedicated to
the public use by the proprietor, shall operate to the extent to which it is vacated as a
revocation of the acceptance thereof and
the relinquishment of the city's fee therein
by the governing body.
Thus the acceptance of dedication of the
northern third of the street to the public
use by the platting of the Argonne Park
Subdivision was revoked by the ordinance.
When the board acquired the fee to the
land abutting the street, there was a pre8. White v. Salt Lake City, 121 Utah 134, 239
P.2d 210 (1952).

sumption that the conveyance included the
fee to the highway center line subject to
the public right of way (determinable fee).9
Upon passage of the ordinance vacating the
street, the city no longer had any title or
interest in the premises; and, therefore, the
city had nothing to sell or convey and the
quit claim deed was a nullity as to any
interest in the roadway dedicated in the
Argonne Park plat.10 However, these consequences are of no benefit to plaintiffs,
since the fee interest reverted to the abutting property owner, the board.
Plaintiffs further urge that the quit
claim deed constituted a gift of public property to the board and that the alleged consideration was a sham.
[5] When a street is vacated and the
municipality does not own the underlying
fee, the municipality has no proprietary interest in the property and is not entitled to
compensation.11
The asserted "reversionary interests"
claimed by the two plaintiffs, who are property owners in Argonne Park, are predicated on certain language in Boskovich v. Midvale City Corp}2
. . . We have held . . . that
if the dedicated streets of a subdivision
are laid out and right to the use thereof
has arisen, a private easement arises
therein which constitutes a vested proprietary interest in the lot owners, which
easement survives extinguishment of any
co-existing public easement calling for
just compensation. .
Section 10-8-8.5, U.C.A.1953, expressly
provides that the action of a governing

11. Puget Sound Alumni of Kappa Sigma v. City
of Seattle, 70 Wash.2d 222, 422 P.2d 799
(1967); 11 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations
(3rd Ed. Rev.) § 30.189, p. 123.
9. Fenton v. Ceder Lumber & Hardware Company, 17 Utah 2d 99, 404 P.2d 966 (1965).
12. 121 Utah 445, 243 P.2d 435, 437 (1952).
10. Payne v. City of Laramie, Wyo., 398 P.2d
557, 562 (1965).
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body vacating a street shall not impair the
right of way and easements therein, if any,
of any lot owner.
The board has made no attempt to close
the vacated street and thus interfere with
any private easements.13 The trial court
concluded as a matter of law:
"The private rights, if any, of the owners of property in the Argonne Subdivision are not concluded or determined by
these Findings, Conclusions or Judgment."

Margaret S. MINEfiR, Plaintiff,
v.
The BOARD OF REVIEW OF the
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of
Utah, Defendant.
Robert W. ROSKELLEY, Plaintiff,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY, Defendant.

Nos. 14696 and 14728.
Whatever private easements the property
owners of Argonne Park might have, they
Supreme Court of Utah.
are certainly not the type of reversionary
Dec. 12, 1977.
interests which plaintiffs claim. The claim
was that upon termination of the city's
In two cases it was found by the Indusdeterminable fee, the underlying fee reverttrial
Commission that unemployment comed to the owners in Argonne Park rather
pensation
claimants had knowingly failed to
than the abutting fee holder, the board.
report
work
and earnings during times they
The asserted consequence thereof was to
claimed
to
be unemployed and without
deprive them of property without due procearnings.
Claimants
were assessed disqualess of law and to condemn property without
ification
and
repayment
of benefits. In an
a proceeding in eminent domain. This
original proceeding for review; the Supreme
claim is without merit.
Court, Hall, J., held that: (1) intention to
defraud was shown by the claims themELLETT, C. J., and CROCKETT, WIL- selves; (2) the statutory disqualification peKINS and HALL, JJ., concur.
riod was to be retroactive, and (3) the provisions for disqualification and repayment
did not offend due process or equal protection.
Affirmed.
O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM>

Crockett, J., filed a concurring opinion.
Maughan, J., dissented and filed statement.
1. Social Security and Public Welfare
<s=*731
Intention to obtain unemployment compensation benefits fraudulently was shown
13. This court has never expressly ruled on the
extent of the easement acquired when one receives a conveyance which describes the property sold by reference to a plat or map upon
which the streets and alleys are shown. There
are three divergent views as to the extent of
this right and to the granting of relief against

obstruction. See 7 A.L.R.2d 607, Anno.: Conveyance of lot with reference to plat or map as
giving purchaser rights in indicated streets, alleys, or areas not abutting his lot, § 2, p. 612.
Also see 2 Thompson On Real Property (1961
Replacement) § 371, pp. 488-489.
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spondent's which parked safely behind him;
under those conditions Park could not reasonably anticipate that his car was in danger of being injured as it was. We conclude as a matter of law that Park was not
guilty of contributory negligence. No person could reasonably find that he failed to
act as a reasonably prudent person would
act under those circumstances.
We have not found any case directly in
point, but in the following cases the facts
were similar: Webb v. Smith, 176 Va. 235,
10 S.E.2d 503, 131 A.LJL 558; Conrey v.
Abramson, 294 Mass. 431, 2 N.E.2d 203.
Each of those cases invoke the stopping of
a car on a road under what we think were
more dangerous conditions than involved
in this case, yet the court held as a matter
of law that such driver was not guilty of
negligence.
Judgment reversed with directions to
proceed in accordance with this opinion.
Costs to appellant.

eating of the portion of the street and alley
was a denial of due process.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
I. Municipal Corporattois <§=*657(2, 4)
Statute requiring petition by al\ landowners directed to proper public authority
for approval of vacating of city streets
should normally be followed, but a city by
ordinance may vacate or abandon streets
even in a subdivision if public exigency req u i r e s a n d i f a procedure is followed sati s f y i n g . statutory requirements and require^ M c
m / n / o f due ^
includi
consideration
of
n o t i c e > f a i r h e a r i n g > md
^ y substantial rights involved. U.C.A.
1943, 15-S-8, 78-5-6 to 78-5-8.

2. Constitutional Law <S=278(h
Eminent Domain <5=M06
Where city without notice to, application by, or hearing of any kind afforded any
owner of realty in platted subdivision of
city enacted ordinance vacating part of
street and alley where school board owned
WOLFE, C. J., and McDONOUGH, realty abutting on both sides of street, so
CROCKETT, and HENRIOD, JJ., concur. that a cul-de-sac was created as to lots of
certain landowners, there was a taking of
property without due process of law and
without just compensation. U.C.A. 1943,
IBE«5YSm>
15-8^8, 78-5-6 to 7&-5-8; U.S.C.A.Const.
Amends. 5, 14; Const art. 1, §§ 7, 22. 1

BOSKOVICH et al. v. M I D V A L E CITY
CORP. etmL
No. 7758.

Supreme Court of Utah.
April 17,1932.

3. Municipal Corporations €=657(7)
Even if city, in vacating portion of
street on both sides of which property of
school board abutted, had satisfied requirements of due process by giving reasonable
notice and conducting a fair hearing, still
city could have vacated no more than t*he
public easement or right which the city had
in the street, which would have effect of
relieving city from further responsibility
for maintenance and control, but private
easement of landowner would have persisted.2

Milan Boskovich and Frieda M. Boskovieh
brought suit against Midvale City Corporation, and others, for an injunction ana for
damages because of the dosing of a street
and alley by city ordinance. The 3rd Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, David T. Lewis, J., entered judgment for dePugsley, Hayes & Rampton, Salt Lake
fendants, and plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court, Henriod, X, held that the va- City, for appellants.
I. Hall
P.2d
Utah
Lake

v. North Ogden, 109 Utah 304, 166
221; Wall v. Salt Lake City, 50
593, 168 P. 766; Sowadzki v. Salt
County, 36 Utah 127. 1C1 P. I l l ;

Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah 501, 126 P.
959.
2. Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah 501, 126 P.
959.

*.*a.wx*xw AXirUXbJLAXb, ZQ. BE&LtitS

Ben G. Bagley, Midvale, Grant Macfar- part of the school yard, creating a cul-desac as to plaintiffs' property on Jordan Avelane, Salt Lake City, for respondents.
nue and as to the property of Cox and
HENRIOD, Justice.
Draper on the alley.
Appeal from a no cause of action judg[1] The city justifies its action under
ment. Plaintiffs sought an injunction and general statutory authority granting cities
damages against defendants, where a por- power to create and vacate streets and altion of a street and alley was closed by city leys by ordinance.1 Plaintiffs challenge the
ordinance. The judgment is reversed and procedure pursued as being in excess of
remanded, with costs on appeal to plaintiffs. that authority, and urge that where a platPlaintiffs own lots in Eastvale Addition, ted subdivision is involved, the authority
a platted, recorded and accepted subdivi- claimed by the city is interdicted and presion in Midvale. The street and alley in empted by special statutes,2 requiring petiquestion are included therein, and the shad- tion by all owners directed to the proper
ed area of the subjoined sketch represents public authority for approval. We believe
this latter statute normallv should be folthe closed portion.
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Without notice to, application by, or
hearing of any kind afforded any property
owner, Midvale's council enacted an ordinance vacating the shaded area, which had
been used for vehicular travel. The school
board owned property abutting on both
sides of the shaded area, and it took possession thereof as owner to the middle of a
vacated street, fenced it off and made it a

lowed, but recognize the fact that a city, by
ordinance, might vacate or abandon streets
even in a subdivision, if public exigency requires and if a procedure is followed satisfying statutory requirements and requirements of due process, including reasonable
notice, a fair hearing and consideration of
any substantial rights involved. Plaintiffs
complain that no such procedure was fol-

I. Title 1&-&-8, U.OA.1943: 'They may
lay out, establish, open * * * streets,
alleys * * * and may vacate the same
or parts thereof, by ordinance."

2. Tide 78-5-6, 7 and 8, U.O.A.1943.
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lowed here, and we are consffa1ned~ItoI==the^platted-streets, dedicated and duly acagree.
cepted, shall continue as a means of travel
-^ until public exigency otherwise demands,a r
[2] There are a number of ways that\
i•n w hi i -c ih l ia_t t e_r_ e v e n t d J„.
u e p r o c e s s ^~-J j u s:..*t
J A

eCt m

y

f

%

A

r

f_ ! l ^ ^ f . ° ! ^ ° S l _ . „ . ° - I compensation must enter the picture
dinance, there must be something more than
Defendants are not remediless, Midvale
its mere enactment. We believe and hold
might
have ended the public easement byj
that the procedure followed by Midvale in
ordinance
so long as pertinent statutory and
this case, sans notice, petition or hearing,
due
process
requirements were satisfied.
was an unquestioned departure from the
The
school
board
might have eliminated the
elementary principle that property cannot
private
easement
by
orderly employment of
be taken without due process of law and
4
the
statutory
provisions
and fundamental
without just compensation.
principles relating to eminent domain,9 but
[3] Furthermore, even if the city had| neither could take from Mr. B his private
satisfied the requirements of due process easement without fair "wippngatinn.
by giving reasonable notice and conducting
In remanding this case, the trial court is
a fair hearing, still it could have vacated no instructed to enter an order requiring remore than the public easement or right moval of any obstruction on the property
which the city had in the shaded area,6 described, unless the parties by stipulation
which would in turn have the effect of re- amicably agree to maintain the status quo
lieving it from further responsibility for until such time as their differences may be
maintenance and control.* The private resolved. There seems to be little reason
easement which Mr. B, plaintiff herein had,] in this case, where it appears obvious that
would have persisted.
J the school children need the space, and the
This case involves a duly platted subdivi- damage to Mr. B does not appear to be very
sion containing streets and alleys and is great, why the parties by stipulation and
thus distinguishable from the authority amendment of their pleadings to conform
cited by defendants.7 We have held, in a with principles here announced, and after a
case cited even by defendants, that if the hearing, cannot arrive at a fair adjustment
dedicated streets of a subdivision are laid in the interest of these children.
out and right to the use thereof has arisen,
WADE, MCDONOUGH and CROCKa private easement arises therein which
constitutes a vested proprietary interest in ETT, JJ., concur.
the lot owners, which easement survives
WOLFE; Chief Justice (concurring).
'extinguishment of any co-existing public
I concur, but make the following observaeasement calling for just compensation.8
Hence, Mr. B cannot be cul-de-sacked by tion. In the main opinion, reference is
the city or the school board without due made to tfhe "public easement" of Midvale
process of law, and a respect for any loss City in the street which was closed. Under
of use proven to have been enjoyed by him Sec. 78-5-4, U.CA.1943, the City has a detheretofore,—though sudi loss may not be terminable or limited fee which is a higher
great. This is as it should be, since people right than an easement That section procustomarily buy property in subdivisions, vides that the filing and recordation of
part of the consideration for which is paid m a p s a n d p l a t s o f a s u b d i v r s i o n " *
on the representation and assumption that sha11 c * c r a t c ** a d e d i c a t l o n o f a11 s t r e e t s 3. Hall v. North Ogden, 109 Utah 304,
166 P.2d 221; Wall v. Salt Lake City, 50
Utah 593, 168 P. 766; Sowadzki v. Salt
Lake County, 36 Utah 127, 104 P. Ill;
Title 78-5, supra; Title 1S-8-8, supra.
4. Utah Const., ArfcL, Sees. 7 and 22; U.S.
Const., V and XTV Amendments; Tuttle v. Sowadzki 41 Utah 501. 126 P. 959.

5. Tuttle v. Sowadzki, supra; 150 A.L.R.
652, 658.
6. 150 A.LJL 644.
7. Robinett v. Price, 74 Utah 512, 280 P.
736.
8. Tuttle v. Sowadzki, supra.
9. Title 104-61, U.CA.1943.
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alleys and other public places, and sshall
vest the fee of such parcels of land as are
therein expressed, named or intended for
public uses in such county, city or town for
the public for the uses therein named or intended" (Emphasis added.) It is true that
in the cases of Sowadzki v. Salt Lake County, 36 Utah 127, 104 P. I l l , and Turtle v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah 501, 126 P. 959, this court
referred to the interest of the county in a
platted subdivision as both a determinable or
a limited fee and a public easement, using
the terms interchangeably. But the terms
are not synonymous. The confusion may
have stemmed from Sec. 36-1-7, U.C.A.
1943, providing that "By taking or accepting
land for a highway the public acquires only
the right of way and incidents necessary to
enjoying and maintaining it. A transfer of
land bounded by a highway passes the title
of the person whose estate is transferred to
the middle of the highway." S e c 36-1-7 is
found in our code in the title on Highways,
wfaereas Sec. 78-5-4 is found under the title
on Real Property and under the section
thereof dealing with Plats and Subdivisions. Clearly, Sec. 78-5-4 governs the
rights of a county, city or town in the
streets of a platted subdivision. While it
makes no difference in the instant case
whether the City has a determinable fee or
a public easement, the distinction is pointed
out because there may be cases where the
difference is vital. See White v. Salt Lake
City, Utah, 239 P.2d 210.

*Q

| KEY NUMBER STS1IM>

Per Curiam, held that there was no sufficient showing of injustice or excuse to relieve appellant from failure to comply with
rule requiring timely service of a designation of record.
Appeal dismissed.
I. Courts <§=>€5(4)
Although new Rules of Civil Procedure
were intended to provide liberality in procedure, it is expected that they will be followed,, and unless reasons satisfactory to
court are advanced as basis for relief from
complying with them, parties will not be
excused from so doing.
2. Courts <@=>85(4)

Parties will be relieved from failure
to comply with new Rules of Civil Procedure only when showing is made that some
inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or
mistake has occurred and that substantial
injustice will be done.
3. Appeal and Error <§=3607(l)

Record disclosed no sufficient showing
that injustice would result and that failure
to serve designation of record within time
and as required by Rule of Civil Procedure
occurred because of excusable neglect or
other cause which would require court in
interests of justice to relieve appellant from
failure to comply, and hence appeal would
be dismissed. Rules of Civil Procedure,
rules 73(a), 75(a).

D. Ray Owen, Jr., Lyle McLean Ward,
and Charles L. Ovard, all of Salt Lake
City, for appellant.
Ned Warnock, George A. Critchlow, and
A. W. Watson, all of Salt Lake City, for
respondent.

P E R CURIAM.
In
this case the respondent has moved to
No. 7791.
dismiss the appeal because the appellant
Supreme Court of Utah.
failed to serve upon respondent a designaApril 21, 1952.
tion of record within the time and as required by Rule 75(a) U.R.C.P., although
Action by Virginia B. Holton against Par- the designation of record was filed with the
ley P. Holton. The Third Judicial District
district court.
Court, Salt Lake County, Clarence E. Baker,
Rule 73(a) makes this failure to serve a
J., rendered an adverse decision, and plaintiff appealed. The respondent moved to designation of record on the respondent
dismiss the appeal. The Supreme Court, non-jurisdictional, but also gives this court
HOLTON v. HOLTON.

